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Synergistic Security: A Work System Case Study of the Target Breach
Abstract

Recent publicized security breaches can be used to evaluate information security programs. The processes and
procedures that allowed the event to occur can be examined in a case study and then be used to find methods
for future mitigation of risk. The Target security breach is used in this study to examine the organization’s
information security program using a macro-ergonomic model. This research posits that an information
security program should consider the work system design, based in macro-ergonomics, to help mitigate
information security risk to the organization and ensure an efficient and effective information security
program. Based on a seminal macro-ergonomic model, the Leavitt Diamond Model (1965), an information
security model was designed. The Synergistic Security Model can be used to examine relationships between
macro-ergonomic information system constructs. The relationships that occur between the structure of the
organization (policies, procedures, leadership, etc.), the people, the technology, and the tasks can have an
impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of an information security program. For the purpose of examining
these relationships, the Synergistic Security Model is divided into triads, consisting of: Triad 1: Information
Security Structure- Information Security Technology-People (Information Security Behavior); Triad 2:
Information Security Structure-Information Security Tasks-People (Information Security Behavior); Triad 3:
Information Security Tasks-Information Security Technology-People (Information Security Behavior); and
Triad 4: Information Security Tasks-Information Security Technology-Information Security Structure. This
paper will examine the relationships found in the Target data breach, reported in December 2013.
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SYNERGISTIC SECURITY: A WORK SYSTEM CASE
STUDY OF THE TARGET BREACH
1. Introduction
Insider threats to organizational information systems are a significant security
concern. Considerable damage to organizational information systems has occurred
by insiders with legitimate access to the organization’s data and many executives
report that organizational users are more likely to cause damage to the system than
outsiders.
(Carnegie
Mellon
CERT
Program;
CSO
Magazine;
PricewaterhouseCoopers & United States Secret Service, 2013). One means of
causing this damage is when organizational employees can unknowingly allow
outside hackers to gain access to sensitive information. Information system
employees make decisions and organize their activities on a daily basis. Their
actions have the potential to affect the entire organization, positively or negatively.
Hackers know employees are a potential weakness in the information security
fortress. Because of the nature of the design of an organization and the work that
must be done to make the business successful, information system users often face
decisions between choosing to complete their job tasks efficiently and effectively
or to follow information security controls. Previous research indicates that users
will often circumvent information security controls when they are attempting to
complete their job tasks (Dhillon, 2001; Nash & Greenwood, 2008; Stanton, Stam,
Mastrangelo & Jolton, 2005). This circumvention creates a substantial risk to the
organization. Recent publicized information security breaches, such as the Target
breach of December 2013, can be used to analyze the efficiency and effectiveness
of an information security program. Forbes (Sept 8, 2014) indicated that Target
experienced a cost of $148 million due to the breach.
Research indicates that users will often choose to complete job tasks over
choosing to follow information security controls (Albrechtsen, 2007; Besnard &
Arief, 2004; Post & Kagan, 2007). As users complete their work, they will
determine their goals and values, which in turn will affect their actions and
behaviors (Beautement, Sasse & Wonham, 2008; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006;
Hedstrom, Kolkowska, Karlssom & Allen, 2011). This situation is a trade-off
where users are making a choice between “right versus right” (Badaracco, 1993).
Organizational goals are focused on productivity and to minimize costs.
Information security goals focus on protecting the information systems and often
do not examine the effect that the security program has on the user’s task
completion. At the same time, organizational leaders consider the information
security program a cost to the organization and therefore leaders often look for ways
to cut those costs. The organization’s employees struggle to find the right direction
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and the correct choices. This struggle is caused by a disharmony between the
different constructs of a macro-ergonomic system. Creating harmony between these
constructs can assist organizations with creating an efficient and effective
information security program. The macro-ergonomic model, Synergistic Security
Model, can be used to assist researchers and practitioners in examining areas of the
information system program that have disharmony and therefore cause the program
to be inefficient and ineffective. This research will gain insight into factors that
contribute to poor information security decisions and assist in shedding some light
on possible solutions to the issue.

2. Literature Review
There has been significant research on information security policy and procedure
compliance (Albrechtsen, 2007; Besnard & Arief, 2004; Ifinedo, 2012; Kraemer &
Carayon, 2007; Post & Kagan, 2007; Siponen, Mahmood & Pahnila, 2009,
Siponen, Pahnila & Mahmood, 2014; Stanton et al., 2005). Additionally, previous
research has indicated that information security can interfere with user job tasks
(Post & Kagan, 2007; Ruighaver, Maynard & Chang, 2007). Information security
must be a balance between data access for the authorized users and ensuring the
protection of the data. Organizations need to understand the impact of information
security programs on employees. Organizations should consider the relationship
information security has on all of the basic systems within the organization.
Information security leaders can examine this relationship between the constructs
of the work system to minimize the pressure on employees to disregard security
requirements. When organizations implement information security within an
organization, the relationships between the structure, technology, people and tasks
will be impacted. Disharmony between these constructs will impact human
behavior and can cause them to make poor choices. For example, employees may
choose to complete a job task over following information security controls.
Previous research has considered the human behavior aspect to understand
user’s non-malicious circumvention of information security controls. For example,
one study examined how people viewed their security related risks using threat
assessments and another study examined user wants or needs, such as convenience
(West, 2008; Workman, Bommer & Straub, 2008). Still other studies related to
human behavior included habit, protection motivation theory (PMT), knowledge,
training, or skills (Leach, 2003; Vance, Siponen and Pahnila, 2012). However, these
studies do not consider the all of the components of a work system. They only focus
on the user or the people construct of the work system. Using a macro-ergonomic
perspective can provide additional information on user behavior that may not be
evident from a ‘user only’ perspective.
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Previous research also considered organizational factors that could impact a
user’s choice to circumvent information security controls. For example, one study
indicated that the organizations should focus on attempting to influence the user
behaviors and normative beliefs (Dhillon, 2001). General Deterrence Theory was
also examined as an organizational method for modifying user information security
behavior (D’Arcy, Hovav & Galletta, 2009). Research was conducted that
considered the use of shaming within the organization to influence user information
security behavior (Harris & Furnell, 2012). Yet another example of organizational
influences on information security behavior is the establishment of an information
security culture (Alfawaz, Nelson, Mohannak, 2010; De Veiga & Eloff, 2009;
Vroom & von Solms, 2004). While these studies considered the organizational
perspective, they do not include all of the constructs of a work system design. For
example, the Dhillon (2001) study aimed at user behavior and normative beliefs,
but did not consider the impact of poorly designed policies or old and unreliable
technology on employee security behavior.
Usability of information security controls has been analyzed as an influence on
user information security behavior. Often system developers do not focus on the
usability of information security controls, but rather on the implementation of
security requirements and the technical systems (Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012). For
example, users are sometimes required to remember dozens of passwords, work
under a policy that prevents the passwords from being written down, and are not
provided a technical solution to assist users with storing all of their passwords
(Adams & Sasse, 1999). Of course, their job tasks require they must log into all of
these systems. This situation provides the perfect setup for user circumvention of
information security controls (circumvention of the policy that says they cannot
write down passwords). Usability examines the relationship between the
technology and the people, but does not consider the structure or task constructs
that may also play a role in the behavior of the users. Perhaps the policy against
writing down the passwords could be adjusted to say users can store the passwords
in a secure manner, but cannot store them in an easily accessible location. Or
perhaps the organization can purchase a password management system or use a
single sign-on application.
Little research considers the organizational view using socio-technical
examination of user information security behavior. The multiple password
example could benefit from the socio-technical view, analyzing the impact of the
security requirements using four constructs, human behavior, the tasks required, the
structure of the organization (policies, processes and leadership) and the technology
available. One seminal macro-ergonomic model that can assist with this analysis
is the Leavitt Diamond Model (Leavitt, 1965). The Leavitt Diamond Model
contains the four constructs listed above: People, Tasks, Structure, and
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Technology. The Leavitt Diamond Model (1965), a work system design, will assist
in the understanding of user information security behaviors. The socio-technical
structure of work system designs can have a significant impact on user information
security behavior. A work system that is not in harmony impacts employee behavior
and causes them to circumvent information security requirements in the process of
completing job tasks.

3. Theoretical Model
Previous information security studies have applied the macro-ergonomic
perspective to information security (Kraemer & Carayon, 2007; Kraemer, Carayon
& Clem, 2009). Factors in computer and information security vulnerabilities were
studies conducted by Kraemer et al. (2009). Kleiner (2006) indicates that macroergonomics is centered on making the organizational system work in a harmonious
way. When the organizational system is working harmoniously, the organization
will experience fewer problems, such as errors or violations because everything is
working smoothly together. Macro-ergonomics is a mixture of two schools of
thought. The first is the Classic school of thought with studies on supervision,
hierarchy, reward systems, and span of control. The second school of thought is on
Human Relations, which includes things like teams, motivation, and machine
automation. The balance between these two schools of thought is where the macroergonomic perspective fits (Smith and Sainfort, 1989). This research posits that a
harmonious work system for information security will result in fewer problems,
such as errors and violations.
The Leavitt Diamond model is a seminal theory within the macro-ergonomic
school of thought (Leavitt, 1975). There are four components within the model:
Structure, Technology, Task, and People. See Figure 1 for an illustration of the
Leavitt Diamond research model. Each component cannot be changed without an
impact on the other three. For example, if a new technology were introduced into
the organization, the other three constructs will adjust to the change. In some cases,
the adjustment could have a negative impact on the organization and other times
the change could be positive. When introducing a change, the organization needs
to make sure the constructs of the work system are in harmony to ensure the work
system is efficient and effective. Disharmony between the constructs will prevent
the work system design from being as efficient or effective as it should be. By
examining the areas of disharmony between each of the constructs and making
necessary changes to create harmony, the work system will then begin to adjust to
a more efficient and effective state.
The Leavitt Diamond model can be a basis to create a framework for examining
the information security socio-technical work system. This research posits that the
Leavitt Diamond model can be used to develop a macro-ergonomic model for
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Information Security. This information security model is called The Synergistic
Security Model, Figure 2.

Figure 1: Leavitt Diamond Model (1965)

Figure 2: The Synergistic Security Model

The structure component of the model includes policies and procedures, as well
as organizational relationships, workflow systems, or the systems of authority. The
technology component of the model would represent any problem solving
inventions. The technology component could include anything from a pencil, to a
word processor to an entire information system. The people component includes
the attitudes of the people, their abilities, or their skills and understanding. The last
component is the task component, which includes all of the things that must be
completed to produce goods and services.
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4. A Case Study
A case study method is often used to examine “how” and “why” questions and
provides the opportunity to analyze processes and procedures used in the course of
completing a job task (Yin, 2012). The case study can also help to understand a
phenomenon or to understand a particular situation or to understand interactions
between information technology and other innovations (Darke, Shanks &
Broadbent, 1998; Lee, 1989; Stake, 1995). Additionally, this research tested a
theory for use in the implementation and management of information systems
security. The Target data breach of December 2013 was used as a case to examine
the relationships between the constructs of the Synergistic Security Model. Target
is the second largest United States discount retail chain (Trustmark National Bank
and Green Bank, N.A. v Target Corporation and Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 2014).
Target experienced a major data breach that was reported to the general public in
December 2013. The loss of data occurred from November 27, 2013 through
December 15, 2013 (Trustmark National Bank and Green Bank, N.A. v Target
Corporation and Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 2014). The data collected on this data
breach was used to create the case study for this research. Extensive publications
were created about the Target data breach. These publications have detailed
information that is readily available for review. Most recent data breaches did not
have the extensive amount of detail available that the Target breach had. Therefore,
the Target case could be examined through the lens of this research model.
Each section of the model was divided into triads to allow a more narrow focus
on the relationships. The researcher used online resources that included news
reports, law suite records, the PCI Security Standards, and government reports
regarding the December 2013 Target data breach. The research data was uploaded
into qualitative data analysis software, Atlas.ti, where it could be coded,
categorized, stored and analyzed. This allowed the researcher to look for patterns
and to record relationships that developed between the data.
Using Atlas.ti, the researcher coded the research documents as either
“Structure”, “Technology”, “Task”, or “People”. Statements and quotes were coded
according to where they fit within each of these categories and four families of
codes were established based on the four constructs. A total of 92 codes were
created. The researcher used the query tool to form groups of coded material, based
on each of the Synergistic Security model triads. This allowed the researcher to
analyze the data through each triad’s perspective. Additionally, the researcher used
the search feature to find key words, such as “PCI-DSS” when reviewing the impact
of specific constructs in relation to a triad.
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4.1 The Case: A Summary Of The Target Data Breach
While most of the collected data breach research indicated that Target was not PCIDSS compliant, Trustwise, Inc. had completed a security audit just weeks prior to
the data security breach. This audit indicated Target was PCI-DSS compliant. The
results of the Senate review on how the breach occurred indicated that an HVAC
vendor was a victim of a phishing attack, causing a compromise to one of the logins
used to access Target’s billing and invoice system (A “Kill Chain” Analysis of the
2013 Target Data Breach, 2013). Moving from the billing system, the attackers
were then able to install malicious malware on the point of sale (POS) systems,
where the credit card data was collected during sales and before data encryption
occurred. Over time, the attackers were able to compromise a Target internal server
and create a location to store the stolen POS data. Periodically, the internally stored
stolen data was then transported to an external FTP server using another Target
server. From there, the data was collected using a Russian-based server and a few
other external data drop locations.

5. Discussion Of Model Relationships
Many of the construct relationships found in the data can fit into more than one
triad. The constructs are very interrelated and different triad perspectives of the
model can be used to examine the same situations. The triad allows the researcher
to view the data from the various perspectives of the research model. For example,
three of the triads discussed in this research include the impacts on behavior.
Figure 3 indicates how the structure, task, and technology constructs can impact
compliance behavior. Organizational leaders and the status of the work system
design have the ability to place pressures on the employees.
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Figure 3: Organizational and management influences and pressure outcome matrix

Employees will react to these pressures in ways that leadership is often
unaware. Kluge, Badura, Urbas and Burkolter (2010) examined how framing
affects production within an organization. Subjects of the study could be “seduced
to violate rules in a production setting when explicitly asked”. The study indicated
that leaders must frame newly introduced safety rules as a gain for the company
and for the employees to minimize vulnerability to violations (Kluge et al., 2010).
Rules to safeguard information systems will be subject to the same vulnerabilities
as rules that safeguard the physical welfare of employees. Management framing is
an element of the structure construct in the Synergistic Security Model.
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5.1 Triad Relationship: Structure – Technology – People

Figure 4: The Information Security Structure – Information Security Technology – People
(Information Security Behavior)

The structure construct of the model is represented in the research data by
examining the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI–DSS)(PCIDSS, 2013). Additionally, the structure construct includes the Target leadership
goals and priorities. A review of the research data would indicate a possible lack of
understanding for Target’s leadership for both the design of Target’s information
system and the PCI-DSS standard. Target’s leadership trusted a third party vendor,
Trustwise, Inc., to determine their compliance and Target appeared to rely on the
results of the Trustwise audit as an indication that all was well with the information
system (A “Kill Chain” Analysis of the 2013 Target Data Breach, 2013). The
disharmony between the structure component and the technology component can
be examined by considering each of the PCI-DSS standards.
One PCI-DSS standard states: install and maintain a firewall configuration to
protect cardholder data. This standard addresses the requirement for Target to
control unauthorized access. The unauthorized access took place in U.S. Target
stores from November 27th through December 15th, 2013. Target had firewalls, but
the firewalls were configured in such a way to allow the attackers to move freely
through the network, both in and out, transporting protected cardholder data.
Target’s external firewall configuration and architecture can be called into question.
Additionally, internal firewalls could have assisted in the prevention of this attack
by providing more effective segregation between the billing/invoice application,
which the HVAC vendor employee used, and the POS systems that were infected
with malware. The technology and structure (policy) constructs are not in harmony;
therefore employee behavior can be impacted. The IT staff was not following the
required policies of PCI. Structure, in the form of leadership, did not ensure there
were a sufficient number of skilled security professionals, who were trained and
knowledgeable about protecting the network (Oltsik, 2014). With the lack of proper
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firewall management, users have the ability to access unauthorized areas of the
network or accidently introduce malware to the Target network. In this case, a user
from an outside vendor was able to introduce malware into the Target network
(Olstik, 2014). Target’s attackers gained access to the POS systems through a
billing/invoice application.
There was some network segregation to prevent the attackers from moving from
the billing system to the POS systems, but the movement of the hacker was cloaked
under a name used by the data center, thereby allowing the traffic to pass through
the network undetected (Oltsik, 2014; Riley, Elgin, Lawrence & Matlack, 2014). A
well designed network segregation would have limited the type of traffic that could
move from the billing system to the POS systems. The lack of a well-designed
network segregation that could prevent malicious traffic from moving from one
system, the billing/invoice system, to the POS systems is a disharmony between the
structure (policy) of the organization and the technology. Target leadership failed
to ensure there was harmony between the structure of the organization (policies)
and the configuration of firewalls (technology) of the organization. The lack of
leadership’s concern over the harmony between the policies and the technology
impacted the IT team’s behavior, which meant the correction of the issue was not
addressed. This problem created a significant information security risk to Target
and their information system. Examination of this triad relationship could have
saved Target significant expense and public embarrassment.
A PCI-DSS policy states to protect all systems against malware and regularly
update anti-virus software or programs. Vulnerability scanning and patch
management are needed to ensure the security of the information system remains
at a maximum level. However, vulnerability scans and patch management can
require that the system be unavailable for a period of time. If the leadership of
Target did not consider the downtime for these activities of high enough priority,
then these activities might not have been completed on a regular basis (Schwartz,
2014). Additionally, Target employees failed to install and update anti-malware on
the POS systems. These systems were Microsoft desktop systems and should have
been protected using anti-virus and anti-malware. Role based access to the POS
systems and the implementation of local firewalls combined, could have stopped
the loss of the data. Because Target IT employees did not ensure these security
controls were in place, the Target information system was very vulnerable to
malware and was infected by the hackers. This was an indication that the structure
(policies and leadership’s priorities) constructs were not in harmony with the
technology (no anti-malware or role based access on the POS system and lack of
downtime for scans and patching), which in turn affected the Target IT team’s
behavior because they did not find it important to ensure all systems were kept upto-date and protected with these security controls.
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PCI-DSS policy states organizations should develop and maintain secure
systems and applications. Target data included stored PIN data, which is in
violation of the PCI-DSS standard and indicates disharmony between the structure
and technology constructs. By storing this data, Target provided a method by which
attackers could make the possession of the stolen cardholder data useful. Once
again, this situation provides an insight into the relationship between the structure
and the technology components of the model. The policy does not allow the storage
of this data. The Trustmark suit of Target and Trustwave (2014), indicate the Target
leadership did not consider information security a priority, but rather the goals and
objectives of the organization took priority, which would include the sale of
merchandise to make a profit (Trustmark National Bank and Green Bank, N.A. v
Target Corporation and Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 2014).
PCI-DSS states that organizations must maintain a policy that addresses
information security for all personnel. The contractual agreement between Target
and the HVAC vendor can come into question here. There should be requirements
for Target’s outside users when accessing the Target systems. Perhaps this indicates
that organizations should ensure their vendors are implementing proper information
security controls before a contract is signed. Vendor collaboration on information
security could have assisted Target in the protection of the credit card information
(A “Kill Chain” Analysis of the 2013 Target Data Breach, 2013). Target leadership
and security personnel were either not aware of or did not consider the importance
of meeting this PCI-DSS standard. The leadership would be responsible for
ensuring all contracts with vendors meet the organization’s information security
requirements. The lack of concern from Target leadership with the management of
the vendor employee’s access and ensuring their technology was meeting PCI-DSS
requirement impacted the security team’s ability to protect the Target network.
It appears that Target’s leadership relied on a Trustwise Inc. vendor to ensure
the protection of the information system. Research of the data indicates that
Target’s leadership lacked an emphasis to their employees about the criticality of
information security controls. Leadership falls under the structure component of the
research model. The Target leadership indicated they were PCI-DSS compliant and
they had the Trustwise, Inc audit to validate their beliefs, and yet the very design
of the network would call that into question. This is a disharmony between the
structure component and the technical component of the research model. Target
deferred their information security responsibilities to a third party and then
appeared to consider that sufficient to protect the information system. The
disharmony would then affect the behaviors of the Target system users. The Target
employees would have assumed the system was well protected, just as it appears
their leadership had done. The Target employees would have assumed that no
changes or additional work was required to ensure the information system’s
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security. An additional consideration is that Target system users do not just include
Target employees. The HVAC employee who initially compromised the system
could be considered a Target system user, as well. The need for harmony between
the structure component and the technology component with the HVAC vendor is
evident in that the initial infiltration into Target’s network environment began at
this point. Some practitioners believe that the PCI-DSS standard is not sufficient
for protecting sensitive information (Litan, 2014). While aiming to meet this
specific standard through the use of a third party vendor, Target’s leadership failed
to ensure that every aspect of the information system was as secure as possible
while remaining usable for those who need to access the data.
The review and improvement of the PCI-DSS standard (structure construct) and
the requirements for updated credit cards with chips (technology construct) could
have assisted in the mitigation of risk to the Target customers. Using the Synergistic
Security Model could assist organizations in finding areas of the model that have
room for improvement. Improvements to the banking standard, such as requiring
companies to encrypt the card data while in transit, whether on the company’s
internal network or on its way to a processor, would be an example of changing the
structure of the model. A review would then be needed to determine the impact on
the other constructs. Changing the technology used (chip cards instead of magnetic
strips) could have had a significant impact on the results of the Target breach,
saving the company their reputation, as well as their financial losses (Kitten, 2013;
Liten, 2014). Updating this technology would have required a change to the
structure construct in that a policy would need to require companies’ use of the new
technology. Then, the tasks impacted and the behavior of the people would need to
be examined to determine how the structure and technology construct changes
affected these two constructs.
5.2 Triad Relationship: Structure – Task – People

Figure 5: The Information Security Structure- Information Security Task-People
(Information Security Behavior) relationship

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jcerp/vol2017/iss2/4

12

Harrell: Synergistic Security: A Work System Case Study

One of the very obvious situations in the Target data breach that provides an
indication of the relationship between the structure, task, and people components
of the model was the lack of the Target security team in providing sufficient
monitoring for the information system. This is evident in that the new monitoring
tool installed at Target just six months before the incident was providing multiple,
high level alerts to the IT team. However, there was no response from Target’s
employees (Riley, Elgin, Lawrence & Matlack, 2014). The PCI-DSS standard
requires the logs and firewalls to be monitored every day (PCI-DSS, 2013). A
detailed monitoring of the alerts received by Target’s monitoring system would
have provided sufficient details for the attack to be circumvented. However, the
attack continued for 18 days (Acohido, 2013). To analyze the Structure – Task –
Behavior relationship, several situations could be considered. If the new monitoring
system was providing a significant number of false positive alarms, the team would
have eventually ignored the alerts. This disharmony would cause the Target
security team to fail to analyze the situation. If viewing the incident with a
perspective that the Target security team did notice the alarms, then the team may
have been unsure of the proper response to the alert. The lack of Target’s response
to the alerts could be attributed to a disharmony between the structure (policies and
procedures) and task components of the model. This lack of response indicates the
information security team was not provided proper tasks, or processes, when placed
in a situation they had not experienced before. The team would fail to behave in a
required manner. Additionally, the lack of response could also indicate the Target
team did not have sufficient training or skills to understand how the monitoring
tools work or how the team was to analyze the alerts and logs when they saw a
system alert. Since the monitoring system was fairly new, then the lack of response
could indicate the Target security team was not sufficiently familiar with the tool
to understand what the alert was indicating. The leadership should assist the team
with processes and procedures that ensure the security team will monitor the
information system as required and respond to alerts in a specific, organized
manner. This disharmony was a significant factor in the success of the data breach
attack.
PCI-DSS requires the organization to regularly test security systems and
processes. The impact of the Target data breach indicates the testing of the security
systems and processes was very weak and the testing scenarios failed to consider
all information security risks and vulnerabilities. Testing a system for
vulnerabilities can affect system performance and, if not controlled well, can cause
a system to go down. Additionally, testing systems and processes requires time and
effort, an activity that Target may not have considered important enough to
interrupt normal business. As suggested in the Trustmark lawsuit of Target and
Trustwave, the Target leadership may have considered the operations of Target to
have more priority than conducting information security tests (Trustmark National
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Bank and Green Bank, N.A. v Target Corporation and Trustwave Holdings, Inc.,
2014). If the accusations Trustmark made in the lawsuit are accurate, it indicates
disharmony between the structure and task constructs and it impacts the people
(behavior) component of the research model. The leadership priorities (structure
construct) and the relationship with the tasks required, impacted the IT employees
behavior.
A policy (Structure) from PCI-DSS states: Do not use vendor-supplied defaults
for system password and other security parameters. The Target attackers were able
to exploit a default BMC Software account name and password, meaning that the
BMC Software system defaults were not renamed, which allowed the hackers to
gain entry (Oltsik, 2014). Target indicated they met the PCI-DSS standards, but the
technology was not configured in such a way to meet those standards. This is a
disharmony between the structure and the technology components of the model.
Structure (Policy) says they must rename the default password of the BMC
software. However, in reality, the behavior of the IT team was to leave the default
password as it was. The resulting behavior was that the Target employees did not
follow the policy. Target employees followed leaderships premise that the
Trustwise, Inc. PCI-DSS audit was an indication the information system was secure
and there were not problems to investigate (A “Kill Chain” Analysis of the 2013
Target Data Breach, 2013).
5.3 Triad Relationship: Task – Technology – People

Figure 6: The Information Security Task- Information Security Technology- People
(Information Security Behavior) relationship

Segregation of the network was required according to the PCI-DSS standards (PCIDSS, 2013). These standards fall under the structure component of the research
model. The technology component was to implement and configure firewalls and
V-LANs and other network segregation practices to ensure the network would be
secure. The Task component of the network would include the assigned job tasks
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that the Target security team should have been completing in order to ensure the
network segregation was meeting sufficient levels. Because of the successful
nature of the Target data breach, it is very obvious that the relationship between
these three components was inharmonious. Organizations should review their
systems and ensure there is harmony between each area of the research model to
ensure that the information security of the organization is being addressed and
managed efficiently and effectively. Another data element to analyze for this
research model triad is the warning the Target security team received from the
Symantec Endpoint Protection (an antivirus system) that identified suspicious
behavior on the server that was also identified by the monitoring system (A “Kill
Chain” Analysis of the 2013 Target Data Breach, 2013; Riley, Elgin, Lawrence &
Matlack, 2014). The PCI-DSS standard applies in this situation. The technology is
Semantic software that was sending out warnings to the Target security team, yet
the security team’s behavior was not sufficient to prevent the attack from
continuing. The disharmony between the structure, which provided the policies and
standards, the technology, which provided alerts, and the behavior of the technical
team caused a serious situation to go un-noticed for a significant number of days.
Target leadership relied on the Trustwise, Inc audit to ensure security controls were
at a sufficient level.
The POS data was stolen at the actual point of sale because of malware that was
introduced by a user (Oltsik, 2014; Vijan, 2014). The user most likely fell for a
phishing attempt or some other social-engineering event. Once the user logged onto
the Target system while completing a job task, the hacker was then able to glean
login and password information for access to the Target system. This fits the
relationship between the task (where the user was completing a job task) and
technology (where the user was using technology). It also appears that anti-malware
may not have been active or up to date (technology). This can be coupled with the
people construct where a lack of understanding or awareness of social engineering
risks is evident. There was a disharmony in the information security model that
allowed the malware to provide access to the Target hackers.
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5.4 Triad Relationship: Task – Technology – Structure

Figure 7: Information Security Task – Information Security Technology – Information
Security Structure

When considering the relationship between the triad components of task,
technology and structure for Target’s data breach, the disharmony becomes very
obvious. The structure construct of the research model does not only address PCIDSS, but it also includes internal policies, procedures and processes that are
expected from the employees. This construct will also include the leadership’s
attitudes and values, organizational structures and any other organizational design
that can influence the actions of the employees. As discussed earlier, the structure
construct of the research model was not in harmony with the technology construct.
While the required technology tools appears to have been purchased by Target, the
implementation and configuration of these tools appears to have been lacking,
creating exceptional risk for the Target information system. The relationship
between the structure and task constructs was discussed earlier, as well. There was
disharmony between these constructs because the required actions of the Target
employees and the required processes, procedures and leadership appear to have
been lacking. Last, the relationship between the tasks and technology was in
disharmony as it appears that the Target employees were unsure of how to use or
react with the security monitoring system when the alerts were provided. If the
employees were properly trained, it is also a possible issue that the configuration of
the monitoring tools could have needed to be adjusted to ensure alerts were not
creating too many false positives. As mentioned earlier regarding the compromised
server that stored the stolen data, the structure construct required the default login
and password be changed, the technology existed that would easily allow this task
to be completed, yet the task was never completed. The harmony between each of
these areas was not there. If the employees had too little time, too little skills, or
lack of knowledge, it was an issue that should have been recognized and addressed.
The structure construct in the form of leadership should ensure the employees have
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all of the knowledge, tools, and time needed to implement the security of the
information system. Using the Synergistic Security Model to analyze the harmony
of the security program could have assisted with the correction of some, if not all,
of these issues.
This triad examines the relationships between the information security tasks,
the information security technology and the behavior of the employees. The Target
security team was not very familiar or comfortable with the new system and may
not have developed a trust of that system, which would be a change that was
introduced to the Synergistic Security Model. The Target security team may have
experienced usability issues with the new monitoring tool. The relationship
between the required tasks for Target’s security team and the new technology may
not have been in harmony. While earlier analysis indicated that the PCI-DSS
standard required consistent and reliable log and firewall monitoring, the task did
not occur effectively. The new monitoring system was installed six months earlier,
but the multiple alerts went completely unnoticed and were not responded to (Riley,
Elgin, Lawrence & Matlack, 2014). This is not the only example of disharmony
between the task, technology and structure constructs of the research model.
A task that the Target leadership could have done to ensure the harmony
between PCI-DSS compliance and the technology was to ensure all systems,
including the POS systems, were protected with anti-virus software. The leadership
should have ensured the tasks necessary for information security were completed
by the employees, which most likely meant a requirement for training and planning
for incidents to occur. Additionally, the POS systems could have been configured
to disallow new applications (i.e. malware) to be installed without specific
requirements. These data elements indicate a disharmony between task-technologystructure. Had the Leadership ensured all of the components of the research model
were in harmony, the data breach may not have happened, or at least may not have
been nearly as severe.
6. Limitations
Due to the fact that this research investigates sensitive data that has the potential to
expose weaknesses and vulnerabilities of not only organizations, but also
individuals involved, it is very difficult to obtain deeper information into the “why”
and “how” the incident occurred. Some speculation based on actions of individuals
and statements made by those involved and those conducting the investigations
have to be employed.
Obtaining the documents on the Target Data breach assisted with the analysis,
but to have had access to those involved and obtain direct quotes would have been
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of great benefit. The current research was limited to information that was publically
available.
Last, this was a single case study, which indicates that added case studies would
shed additional light onto the impact of the Synergistic Security Model and would
provide further evidence of the impact of harmony between the constructs. Further
work needs to be conducted to investigate the impact of the Synergistic Security
Model on the efficacy of an information security program.
7. Conclusions
The Synergistic Security Model is based on the seminal macro-ergonomic model,
The Leavitt Diamond Model (1965). The analysis of the data from public sources
indicated that poorly designed security work systems can impact the efficiency and
effectiveness of an information security program. A well designed information
security program should include constructs that work in harmony. Each of these
constructs impact the other constructs. Therefore, when a change is made to any
one of the constructs, an analysis of the impact of that change should be conducted.
A thorough analysis could prevent information security incidents and assist the
organization with establishing a well-designed information security program.
Triads of the model were used to assist with the analysis. However, since a
change of one construct can impact all other constructs, many of the discussed
events fit into several different triads. For example, the fact that the security
personnel at Target did not monitor the alerts from the FireEye Company and India
could be the result of the leadership placing more emphasis on sales and less on
security (Oltsik, 2014). However, this could also be the result of the employees not
receiving sufficient training or it could be the result of the lack of sufficient staff
(Oltsik, 2014). All situations can exist and each situation can fit into the information
Synergistic Security Model, indicating an impact on the other constructs.
The Synergistic Security Model can be used as a work system framework to
ensure that all constructs of an information security program are in harmony. The
harmony of these constructs creates a work system environment that helps
researchers and practitioners understand the impact these constructs can have on
the information system users. This research only looked at the impact of nonmalicious behavior caused by disharmony within the research model. This research
did not consider malicious behavior.
This research did consider the pressures on employee behavior caused by out
of balanced constructs in the Synergistic Security Model. Organizational leaders
must work toward creating the balance between the pressure to complete job tasks
and the pressure to ensure information security compliance.
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It is important that researchers and practitioners continue to examine methods
for ensuring users follow information security controls consistently, thereby
ensuring a more secure information system.
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